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At the Heart of the Vietnam War:
Herbicides, Napalm and Bulldozers




1 The A Lưới Mountains are located in Central Vietnam, in the western part of the Thừa
Thiên Huế province, and the studied area corresponds to the present-day A Lưới district
(fig.  1).  These  mountains  served  as  a  main  battleground  during  the  Vietnam  War
(1961-1975). Attached to South Vietnam (fig. 2) after the Geneva Agreements (1954), they
were located just south of the 17th parallel – the limit that these agreements established
between North and South Vietnam. Moreover, they were crossed by the Hồ  Chí Minh
trail,  which  was  actually  a  strategic  network  of  roads  and  trails  that  the  North
Vietnamese used to provision their southern positions (fig.  3).  These mountains were
largely controlled by the Việt Cộng, and their location explains why they were a primary
target of US-Vietnamese attacks, which included herbicide sprayings (fig. 2). Especially
because of this practice, the Vietnam War is considered a war against the environment:
“the Vietnam War of 1961-1975 stands out as the archetypal example of environmental
war-related abuse” (Westing, 2002).  What are the environmental consequences of this
conflict in the A Lưới Mountains? Are they only visible in the landscape? Are they only
direct? To answer these questions,  military as well as civilian practices were studied.
Knowledge was gathered via archival data and semi-structured interviews conducted in
five  villages.  In  each  village,  between  three  and  five  inhabitants  were  interviewed
collectively  (Robert-Charmeteau,  2015).  The  pre-  and  post-war  landscapes  were  also
mapped  and  compared  to  identify  their  dynamics.  Information  about  the  pre-war
landscapes came from aerial photographs taken between 1950 and 1954 and acquired
from  France’s  Defence  Historical  Service  /  Air  Force  Department.  The  post-war
landscapes were reconstituted by using a Landsat satellite image from 1975. The military
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practices that could have an impact on landscapes were analysed first, before their direct
and indirect consequences on the landscapes were identified.
 
Figure 1: The A Lưới Mountains, western district of Thừa Thiên Huế province
Georeferencing: UTM 48N/WGS 84 Sources:
- Relief: from the topographic map NE-48-16 (Huế) drawn in 2001 at a scale of 1:250,000 by the
Mapping Office of the General Staff of the People’s Army of Vietnam (from a map at a scale of
1:250,000, UTM, dated 1982, modified according to a map drawn at a scale of 1:100,000, in UTM in
1986 and an aviation map at a scale of 1:500,000 from 1994); contour lines were interpolated from
the TIN (triangulated irregular network) parabolic model, without constraint;
- Districts boundaries: from the administrative map of Thừa Thiên Huế, in Cartographic Publishing
House (2004), Vietnam Administrative Atlas – Tập bản đồ hành chính, Nhà xuất bản đồ (Cartographic
Publishing House), Hanoi, p. 40.
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Figure 2: Herbicide sprayings in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1971: the A Lưới Mountains as a
major target
Source: Map from Hatfield Consultants LTD and 10-80 Committee, drawn based on data from the US
Department of the Army (http://www.hatfieldgroup.com/UserFiles/File/
ContaminantMonitoringAgentOrange/VietNamHighlights/ SprayLines.PDF, accessed 6 April 2011)
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Figure 3: The Hồ Chí Minh trail between 1969 and 1973, a network of ways in the Annamite Range,
crossing the A Lưới Mountains
Source: Hoàng Khôi, 2002, modified map
Group 559 included the troops fighting along the Hồ Chí Minh trail.
 
Military practices, attacks against the environment
The US-South Vietnamese camp: environment considered as a
target
2 In January 1962, the US Army launched “Operation Ranch Hand”: It sprayed herbicides
from the air in order to destroy the canopy cover, under which the enemy could hide, and
the crops, which could feed him. These herbicides were applied in high concentrations
and often on repeated occasions. In other words, they were used as chemical weapons
pointed at the environment of the enemy, and they became ecocides. Nearly 80 million
litres were sprayed, including the infamous Agent Orange, mainly over South Vietnam
(Stellman et al., 2003). The A Lưới Mountains were particularly affected, more than the
plain of Thừa Thiên – the name given to the province during the conflict.  This area,
especially its main valley (fig. 4), was one of the major targets of “Operation Ranch Hand”
(fig. 2). The communication routes, including waterways, were subjected to repeated
sprayings, while the highest reliefs were relatively spared.
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Figure 4: Herbicide sprayings in the present-day A Lưới district between 1965 and 1971
Georeferencing: UTM 48N/WGS 84
Source: from the map of the Forest Inventory and Planning Institute (FIPI), obtained in 2005 from
Phùng Tửu Bôi, botanist, former director of FIPI’s environmental service, director of ANCODEC
(Assistance for Nature Conservation and Community Development Center, an ONG) and researcher
internationally renowned for his study of the environmental consequences of herbicide sprayings.
Map drawn from C. Smith and D. Watkins, 1981. The Vietnam Map Book: A Self-help Guide to Herbicide
Exposure, Winter Soldier Archive, Berkeley, CA, 107 p.
3 The impact of herbicide sprayings is controversial (Robert, 2011), but in the case of dense
forests it seems to vary especially according to the number of sprayings:
4 “In those upland forests that were subjected to one spraying (an estimated 1.5 million
hectares), a minimum of 10 per cent of the overstory trees, and often two to three times
that  fraction,  have  been  killed  […].  (One  experienced  logger  whom  we  interviewed
insisted that only 30 per cent of the timber trees survive one spraying.) In the multiply-
sprayed upland forests, estimated at 0.4 million hectares, at least half, and sometimes all,
of the trees have been killed” (Westing, 1972).
5 Besides those carried out from the air, some sprayings were conducted on the ground,
especially around US bases, which were scattered across the studied territory (fig. 5). The
main bases were the ones of the Special Forces: A Lưới,  Ta Bat and, above all, A Sầu.
Herbicides were stored at these bases. At all the bases, including the artillery ones, the
soil was often bare – some photos taken during the war prove this point (Robert, 2011).
The total destruction of vegetation and the laying bare of the soil were achieved by other
means, such as fire and bulldozers, which appeared in the US-South Vietnamese arsenal
at the end of 1969. They were considered to be more effective against vegetation – “the
clear tactical superiority of the ‘Rome plow’ […] land-clearing programme” – and they
even contributed to the decline of the defoliation programme (Westing, 1972). However,
it was not possible to verify whether they were used in A Lưới.
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Figure 5: Main US military bases established in the present-day A Lưới district
Georeferencing: UTM 48N/WGS 84
Source: from the “Hue, Vietnam, Laos: Joint Operations Graphic (AIR)” map, MAP12100118 [map], at a
scale of 1:250,000, 1501 AIR Series, Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center,
September 1983, Vietnam Archive Map Collection, The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, http://
www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/virtual/vva/servlet.starweb, accessed 24 February 2008
Remarks: Some bases are only approximatively located because they were not on the source, unlike
the other ones that were precisely marked on the source material with a point. All of them were a priori
added onto the original source map. It was not possible to mention all the bases on the map, although
the information obtained thanks to the main source was completed by using maps from the North of
the I Corps Tactical Zone (http://www.327infantry.org/second/nicorpsmap, accessed 11/14/2009).
The bases of the Special Forces, which neither of the sources noted, were added.
6 The landscapes were also altered by another US military practice: bombings. They formed
craters and mutilated and destroyed the surrounding trees. Similar to the First World
War in France (Gaudemard, 1994), some trees appeared strafed: “Extending far beyond
the dimensions of the opening in the forest created by the bomb strike is the damage to
living trees caused by shrapnel” (NAS, 1974). Nevertheless, the destruction of trees was
limited. A larger area could be affected in the case of incendiary – for example, napalm –
bombs. The Thừa Thiên province was among the most bombed-out areas (fig. 6), and its
mountains, especially the ones of A Lưới,  were particularly affected, as the bombings
were intense.
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Figure 6: US aerial bombing in South-East Asia, a priori between 1965 and 1975
Source: Hatfield Consultants Ltd (ordnance display prepared by the Federal Resources Corporation,
Washington, D.C.), http://www.hatfieldgroup.com/files/bombs_vietnam.pdf, accessed 5 February
2006 (http://www.hatfieldgroup.com/UserFiles/File/ContaminantMonitoringAgentOrange/
VietNamHighlights/bombs _vietnam.pdf, accessed 6 April 2011), modified map. Georeferencing in
latitude/longitude.
DCW: Digital Chart of the World – Cacta: Combat Air Activities file, October 1965-December 1970 –
Seadab: Southeast Asia Database, January 1970-June 1975 – MFD: a priori Multi-Function Display.
7 Although it is a challenge to identify the bombs, represented with coloured patches, it
was not possible to remedy this defect. The meaning of the line crossing Laos remains
unknown.
8 These practices, especially the herbicide sprayings, had impacts on ecosystems, and that
is why the Vietnam War is considered a war against the environment. In the Thừa Thiên
province, because of its strategic position, the A Lưới area is the one where the military
practices were the most intense and the destructions were the most important: It is a
mountainous border area, where the Việt Cộng found refuge. Because of their military
practices, these fighters could alter the landscapes and cause destruction.
 
Destruction caused by the Việt Cộng
9 During  the  war,  the  A  Lưới  Mountains  suffered  significant  damage,  in  particular
deforestation because of military practices, but these impacts were not only due to the
US-South Vietnamese side. Although rarely mentioned in literature, the Việt Cộng also
destroyed part of the environment, especially along the Hồ Chí Minh trail. One reason for
the lack of records could be that the Vietnamese military archives are still inaccessible.
Failing that, some books written by Vietnamese (Hoàng Khôi, 2002; Đồng Sĩ Nguyên, 2005)
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do provide heuristic accounts, scriptural and photographic evidence (Robert, 2011) that
made the Việt Cộng practices more well-known.
10 As mentioned, the Hồ Chí Minh trail was not a single road. It was a large network of many
roads and trails (fig. 3). New land routes were continually opened, especially based on
operations (Đồng Sĩ Nguyên, 2005). Their construction destroyed vegetation and levelled
the relief (Robert, 2011, from gathered photos). The tools were rudimentary at first, like
during the Indochina War: “As early as 1945 and during the early days of the war, groups
of cadres […] travelled southwards on foot to open the way along the length of Trường
Sơn. Their tools were merely bush-whackers and pick-axes” (Hoàng Khôi, 2002). These
tools  used at  the beginning were subsequently perfected.  Bulldozers were mentioned
from January 1967 along the Hồ Chí Minh trail (Đồng Sĩ Nguyên, 2005). Thus the Việt Cộng
used them before US soldiers did as a “weapon”. But the Việt Cộng also took advantage of
enemy bombings. At least, Đồng Sĩ Nguyên (op. cit.), leader of Group 559, envisaged this
option at the beginning of 1967:
11 “A number of bomb craters could be reshaped into shelters for inactive bulldozers and
transport vehicles. […] It is necessary to exploit to the maximum the destruction caused
by enemy bombs in the both sides of roads to broaden them and enable several vehicles
to drive alongside. The adversary has apparently given us explosives for road building.”
12 The  construction  of  infrastructure,  like  bridges,  to  facilitate  movements  caused
deforestation,  even  if  it  seems  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the  large-scale
destruction inflicted by the US. The materials, taken from plants, were collected on the
spot (Robert, 2011). Besides these impacts of the road openings, “the continual movement
of  troops  and  war  machinery  (tanks  and  artillery  pieces)  increased  the  damage”
(Brindley, 1973, transl.) caused to the environment.
13 Some construction work was also carried out in the area. Even if it was rudimentary, it
still caused deforestation and alterations. Trees were felled to allow for the passage of the
oil pipeline, which ran along the Hồ  Chí Minh trail,  or to put in medical or technical
infrastructure (warehouses or vehicle repair workshops etc.; Robert, 2011, according to
the gathered photos) and military stations. The ground was moved while trenches and
tunnels were being dug for the Việt Cộng and inhabitants to take shelter. Besides this
deforestation, we should consider the impoverishment that occurred near these spots due
to the collection of firewood and wood used for the construction of facilities, shelters or
other infrastructures.
14 The Việt Cộng also caused damage with land mines that they often put near the villages
(Kaspi, 2004), causing loss of human life in the opposite camp and destruction. Fire also
led to further deforestation: “One of the main causes of forest destructions in Vietnam is
currently fire. Some fires are deliberately caused by the Vietnamese Army” (Orians and
Pfeiffer, 1970, transl.).
15 The forest allowed the Việt Cộng to hide. The relief played the same – perhaps a greater1 –
role. And it explains why the mountains, particularly the ones of A Lưới,  served as a
refuge area for these fighters. There, the forests were dense and wider than in the other
landscape  units  (Robert,  2011).  The  US-South  Vietnamese  camp  thus  conducted  war
against this environment, of which the enemy took advantage by targeting the forests in
particular. “Mostly, the devastation is caused by the US Army” (Brindley, 1973, transl.),
but the Việt Cộng also caused destruction. The military practices of both camps thus had
direct consequences on the landscapes, but they also had indirect impacts.
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Direct and indirect impacts on the landscapes
16 Military  practices  altered  the  landscapes.  But  to  what  extent  were  they  factors  of
landscape dynamics during the war? What was their share of the responsibility? Was the
forest decline the result of these practices and of these practices alone? To answer these
questions, it is necessary to reconstruct the pre- and post-war landscapes and to study
the civilian practices, their development and their impacts during the conflict.
 
Landscape dynamics during the war
17 The fighters’ practices during the war are the cause of regressive landscape dynamics.
They  indeed  destroyed  the  vegetation,  with  reservations  for  herbicides:  As  we  have
already mentioned, forest regression only occurred when sprayings were repeated. It is
challenging to identify the impact of each practice because neither the effects of each one
on its own nor those of all of them combined can be precisely localized. Only the overall
impact of the conflict can be assessed, at least in certain parts. Because of the sources
(aerial photographs) used for the pre-war inventory, their time processing and because
they were incomplete (these photographs do not cover the southern part of the present-
day A Lưới district), the dynamics that occurred during the war are known only along
certain transects. Like the satellite image of 1975, these sources were selected because
they are original and are thus a priori unbiased. This criterion is all the more important
because  the  topic  is  controversial.  These  sources  were  also  the  only  ones  that  were
available to form an idea of the state of the landscapes at the time.
18 The aerial  photographs showed land use around 1954,  like along the Con Tôm Hồng
Thương transect, which is located in the heart of the A Lưới Valley and is here taken as
an example (fig. 7). They contradict the assertions of some authors who exaggerate the
presence of pre-war forests by claiming their ubiquity, particularly in this valley (Vo Quy,
2005;  Lê  Trọng  Cúc,  1983).  This  ubiquity  was  also  noted  by  the  mountain-dwellers
interviewed in several villages, including Con Tôm Hồng Thương. In this case, the reason
is probably that they did not distinguish forests from shrub savannahs.  According to
these iconographic sources, the forests were wider than on the plain (Robert, 2011). But
they  disappeared  in  the  valleys,  on  the  less  steep  grounds,  and  gave  way  to  shrub,
herbaceous  and  bush  savannahs  and  agricultural  lands:  Some  of  these  ones  were
cultivated, and others were abandoned, left to be colonised by spontaneous vegetation
(fig.  7).  Dense (according to the villagers’  accounts;  Robert-Charmeteau,  2015)  forests
extended to the steepest nearby slopes and then on all of the most distant slopes. In the
valleys, above all in the main one – the A Lưới Valley (the northern part of the Con Tôm
Hồng  Thương  transect)  –  the  landscapes  thus  formed  a  patchwork  dominated  by
sylvosystems at different stages.
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Figure 7: Land use along the Con Tôm Hồng Thương transect in 1952
Georeferencing: UTM 48N/WGS 84
Sources: from aerial photographs taken 25 November 1952 (France’s Defence Historical Service / Air
Force Department, 605-A Plot, TV 613 mission). For the localisation of the transect, see Figure 4.
19 Land use in 1975 is known for all the studied areas (fig. 8). The savannahs, herbaceous and
bush first,  extended over the A Lưới  Valley and its nearby slopes,  whereas the most
distant  slopes  were  covered by  more  advanced sylvosystems – pre-forest  formations
(called “in the process of forest reconquest”, according to the considered Vietnamese
classification),  sparse forests  and,  on the higher reliefs,  moderately dense and dense
forests.
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Figure 8: Land use in the present-day A Lưới district in 1975
Georeferencing: UTM 48N/WGS 84
Source: from the Landsat 2 MSS satellite image taken 14 March 1975 (processed with Idrisi
Kilimanjaro sofware)
20 Just as accounts exaggerated the presence of pre-war forests, so too did they exaggerate
the  presence  of  the  savannahs  after  the  war.  The  villagers  and  some  authors
overestimated the impact  of  the war,  and we can read that  “Before the start  of  the
chemical war, A Luoi was covered by a dense forest”; “The chemical war changed the A
Luoi  district  into  a  sinister  theater:  the  forests  of  the  21  victim  communes  were
destroyed, with the exception of a corner in the south of the commune of Hung Nguyen
[actually  Hương  Nguyên,  at  the  southern  end  of  the  district]”  (Lê  Trọng Cúc,  1983,
transl.). The forest decline is real, but it is moderate, based on a reading of the maps
drawn of the landscape dynamics, including the one of Con Tôm Hồng Thương (fig. 9).
This map shows a higher complexity of the dynamics, even if it might be strengthened by
the difference of the sources’ spatial resolution (Robert-Charmeteau, 2015).
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Figure 9: Landscape dynamics along the Con Tôm Hồng Thương transect between 1952 and 1975
Georeferencing: UTM 48N/WGS 84
Sources: cf. the sources for figures 7 and 8. For the localisation of the transect, see figures 4 or 8.
21 North of the A Sap River (fig. 9), the tatters of the pre-war forests disappear, regressing
towards the savannah stage. In the south, the dynamic was identical for the forests near
the river. Beyond, on the higher reliefs where the forests extended farther in 1952, the
regression  was  only  partial.  The  regressive  dynamics  did  not  end  up  only  with  the
disappearance of forests: They also concerned the savannahs, in a limited area, especially
in the north of the map – towards the bare soil stage or, for the shrub savannahs, towards
the herbaceous and bush stage.
22 Not all of the sylvosystems suffered a regressive dynamic. Some remained at the same
stage. To the north of the A Sap River, it was above all the savannahs that remained (fig.
9). In the south, especially on the higher reliefs, it was the forests. However, these ones
could also suffer disturbances. Indeed, all disturbances do not lead to the disappearance
of forests: Some led to bifurcations. In this case, the regressive dynamic do not mean a
return to a non-forest stage. But it could not be checked with the classes, which were
selected  here  according  to  the  identification  possibilities  that  the  sources  provided.
However, some progressive dynamics were perceptible.
23 The forest could make some progress along the undulations located to the north of the A
Sap River (fig. 9), like at the water catchment areas of the Con Tôm River (farther south).
This  spread would have occurred at  the expense of  the herbaceous,  bush and shrub
savannahs.  But  this  is  doubtful  given  the  time  required  for  the  progression  from a
herbaceous  and  bush  savannah  to  a  moderately  dense  forest.  The  change  of  the
savannahs into pre-forest formations is more plausible. It could be observed in limited
At the Heart of the Vietnam War: Herbicides, Napalm and Bulldozers Against th...
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 104-1 | 2016
12
areas to the north of the A Sap River, and in wider areas in the south. The savannahs also
progressed from the herbaceous and bush to the shrub stage, especially in the north.
24 How to explain these progressive dynamics that took place during the war? Military
practices weakened the sylvosystems and caused them to regress, but the war had other
consequences, too: It altered civilian practices.
 
Alterations of civilian practices, the indirect impacts
25 Before the war, semi-nomadic ethnic minorities inhabited the A Lưới Mountains (Robert,
2011;  Robert-Charmeteau,  2015).  These  peoples  practised  slash-and-burn  cultivation,
which explains the fragmentation of the landscape in 1952, as was previously noted. The
lands were cultivated for one to three years. They then lay fallow and were progressively
colonised  by  the  forest,  before  being  again  cultivated.  The  mountains-dwellers  were
clustered in villages. They lived in osmosis with the forests, which provided them with all
the resources they needed (ibid.).
26 When the Vietnam War broke out, the A Lưới Mountains, the main valley first, became a
refuge area for the ethnic minorities who lived close to the plain, according to villagers’
accounts. Even so, the fighting already had an impact on the civilian practices of the
mountains-dwellers, like the accounts given in situ made clear. Herbicide sprayings and
bombings sometimes destroyed the cultivated lands, and thus the villagers worked in
vain. Consequently, they reduced the cultivated area ever more because they were scared
for their lives. The forest products were also collected from shorter distances.
27 At the end of 1960s, the intensity of the battles in the area increased, and many people
fled from the valley to take refuge around Laos. The villages were deserted, and the land
was no longer cultivated. The spontaneous vegetation once again colonised these spaces,
which explains the progressive dynamic that we noted for some sylvosystems during the
war. The military practices forced the mountains-dwellers to alter their practices then to
flee.  They  were  thus  indirectly  the  cause  of  the  progression  of  some  sylvosystems.
However, this one went along with some regressions for other sylvosystems. In fact, in
the  refuge  areas,  smaller  new  lands  were  being  cultivated.  The  villagers  also  built
rudimentary shelters using materials available on the spot. The fires that were set in
order to cultivate or cook were limited to avoid being located and targeted by the US-
South Vietnamese attacks. Not all the mountain-dwellers ended up fleeing: Some stayed
behind while others, including those who had lived elsewhere before the war, even went
into the valley to fight alongside the North Vietnamese Army. They also adapted their
practices to the new context of war. They sought shelter in tunnels and lived on products
they gathered from the forest. During the flight of civilians, no land was cultivated in the
main valley.
28 As soon as the battles stopped, the refuge areas were abandoned and colonised by the
spontaneous vegetation.  The villagers  who had lived in the valley before the battles
returned to their home villages, which was the case for people living around the Con Tôm
Hồng Thương transect. Others followed, such as those whose villages before the war were
in secondary valley and less easily reachable from the plain. In fact, by request of the
Vietnamese government, the ethnic majority, the Kinh, settled in the A Lưới Valley after
the war.
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29 Before the war, the Kinh looked upon the mountains with revulsion (Gourou, 1940), and
thus  only  ethnic  minorities  inhabited  the  A  Lưới  area.  When  the  Indochina  War
(1945-1954) broke out – it had a small impact on the studied area –, the Kinh showed an
“initial reticence to fight in forest” (Marill, 1994, transl.). Even so, “the Viêt-minh […]
knew how to adapt to the tropical jungle to outlive and resist the French Army” (ibid.,
transl.).  From  a  hostile  environment,  the  forest  even  transformed  into  a  protective
refuge, whither the soldiers withdrew when they felt threatened (Robert, 2011). During
the Vietnam War, the ones who fought for the liberation of South Vietnam took up refuge
in the mountains,  including in A Lưới,  and set  up base there.  The revulsion for  the
mountains and their forests seemed to soften, so much so that after the war, admittedly
by  the  request  of  the  Vietnamese  government,  the  Kinh settled  in  areas  that  had
previously been deserted, like the A Lưới Mountains. Thus appears the idea that the war,
through the destruction of vegetation and the opening of new ways, facilitated access to
the mountains and gave the opportunity to the Kinh to become familiar with this area and
to extend their influence to the ethnic minority (ibid.). They also perceived the stakes of
this border area. The arrival of the Kinh in the area had the goal of securing the border.
The settlement of ethnic minorities had the same objective. The war thus altered the Kinh
’s perception of the mountains and their forests. However, by settling, they also increased
the pressure on sylvosystems and largely contributed to the acceleration of the post-war
decline of the forest (Robert, 2011; Robert-Charmeteau, 2015).
30 By altering civilian practices, the military practices had indirect consequences on the
landscapes and their dynamics.
 
Conclusion
31 Because of their strategic position, the A Lưới Mountains were a refuge area for the Việt
Cộng. Moreover, the canopy cover of their dense forests and their reliefs allowed these
fighters to remain hidden. The Việt Cộng took advantage of this environment, which is
why it was targeted by the opposite side. The A Lưới Mountains were among the areas
most  affected by the herbicide sprayings and bombings carried out  by the US-South
Vietnamese troops.  Besides these disturbances,  the Việt  Cộng added other ones.  Their
military practices also had an impact on the environment, even if, for the most part, the
damage was more limited. The military practices were intense in the A Lưới Mountains,
and they altered the landscapes. The identification of landscape dynamics was based on
iconographic data, and it confirmed the regression of sylvosystems during the war. But it
contradicts the most alarmist points of view. The savannahs of 1975 were not the result of
military  practices  alone.  Before  the  war,  the  forests  had  dominated  but  were  not
ubiquitous. Furthermore, by altering the civilian practices, the war also indirectly caused
progressive dynamics. It was an opportunity for the Kinh to become more familiar with
this area, which until then had been deserted. After the war, some moved there, whereas
the ethnic minorities were settled. The purpose was to secure this border area. Pressure
on  the  sylvosystems  increased,  and  the forest  decline  accelerated.  Post-war  civilian
practices soon compromised the healing of the ecosystems that had been affected by the
conflict, worsening the strict impact of the war.
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NOTES
1. “After  an  inspection  on  the  spot,  Roger  Hilsman  (quoted  by  Seymour  Hersh  in  CBW  in
Vietnam), the former head of the Intelligence Service of the State Department, noted that ‘the
leaves were gone, while the branches and trunks remained. And even if they didn’t, the guerrilla
rather used outlines of paths, hills and valleys than branches or leaves to hide’” (CVN, 1970,
transl.).
ABSTRACTS
In the western part of the Thừa Thiên Huế province in Central Vietnam, the A Lưới Mountains
were strongly affected by the Vietnam War (1961-1975). They were a refuge area for the Việt Cộng
and crossed by the Hồ  Chí  Minh trail,  which served as  a  strategic  axis  for  them.  Numerous
herbicide sprayings and bombings, including napalm, struck the mountains and had a greater
intensity than was the case in other landscape units. The US-South Vietnamese troops, which
committed these practices, conducted a war against the enemy’s environment. But the enemy
was also responsible for damage in this regard. In particular, the Việt Cộng used bulldozers to
construct several routes on the Hồ Chí Minh trail. Maps of the land used around 1954 and in 1975
were drawn along transects; a comparison between them shows the landscape dynamics that
occurred during the war. Some sylvosystems of the mountain area of A Lưới regressed, especially
in the main valley. But as an indirect consequence of the war, others made progress. Because of
the fighting, mountain-dwellers belonging to minority ethnic groups changed their practices and
then left the area, thus leading to forest recovery on the disused land. For the Kinh, the ethnic
majority group, the war was an opportunity to become more familiar with the mountain area
that they had previously neglected.
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